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The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Cooperative N-Person Game with Side Payments

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The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Cooperative N-Person Game with Side Payments

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dc.contributor.author Dragan, Irinel C. en
dc.date.accessioned 2010-06-10T00:27:44Z en
dc.date.available 2010-06-10T00:27:44Z en
dc.date.issued 1988-12 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10106/2477 en
dc.description.abstract The bargaining sets have been introduced as solution concepts for cooperative n-person games with side payments by R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler (1964). A further study on the relationships between various concepts of solution for such games is due to R. J. Aumann and J. Dreze (1975). The Aumann/Maschler definition of a bargaining set relies upon a stability principle imposed to the payoffs in this set: an admissible payoff belongs to a bargaining set if for every objection against this payoff there is a counter objection. Two modification of the stability principle have been discussed in earlier papers of the author (Dragan,1985,1987,1988). en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher University of Texas at Arlington en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Technical Report;256 en
dc.subject Cooperative games en
dc.subject Bargaining set en
dc.subject n-person game en
dc.subject Stability principle en
dc.subject.lcsh Game theory en
dc.subject.lcsh Mathematics Research en
dc.title The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Cooperative N-Person Game with Side Payments en
dc.type Technical Report en
dc.publisher.department Department of Mathematics en

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