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Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games

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Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games

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dc.contributor.author Dragan, Irinel C. en
dc.date.accessioned 2010-06-09T16:21:20Z en
dc.date.available 2010-06-09T16:21:20Z en
dc.date.issued 1998-01 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10106/2473 en
dc.description.abstract A new axiomatic characterization of the semivalues of finite cooperative n-person games with transferable utilities is given, by using a potential function. The semivalues are proved to be the unique functionals on the space of such games, which are consistent relative to a Hart/Mas Colell type of reduced game and weighted standard for two person games. The potential is also used to prove the validity of a recursive definition of semivalues, as well as the fact that the semivalues are Shapley values of the so called Power Game. en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher University of Texas at Arlington en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Technical Report;330 en
dc.subject TU games en
dc.subject Shapley value en
dc.subject Cooperative game en
dc.subject Semivalues en
dc.subject.lcsh Game theory en
dc.subject.lcsh Mathematics Research en
dc.title Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games en
dc.type Technical Report en
dc.publisher.department Department of Mathematics en

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