RESEARCH COMMONS
LIBRARY

Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games

ResearchCommons/Manakin Repository

Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games

Show full item record

Title: Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games
Author: Dragan, Irinel C.
Abstract: A new axiomatic characterization of the semivalues of finite cooperative n-person games with transferable utilities is given, by using a potential function. The semivalues are proved to be the unique functionals on the space of such games, which are consistent relative to a Hart/Mas Colell type of reduced game and weighted standard for two person games. The potential is also used to prove the validity of a recursive definition of semivalues, as well as the fact that the semivalues are Shapley values of the so called Power Game.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10106/2473
Date: 1998-01

Files in this item

Files Size Format View Description
MathTechReport330.pdf 866.6Kb PDF View/Open PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show full item record

Browse

My Account

Statistics

About Us