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Discriminatory Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions

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Discriminatory Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions

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dc.contributor.author Heijmans, J. G. C. en
dc.date.accessioned 2010-06-09T16:16:07Z en
dc.date.available 2010-06-09T16:16:07Z en
dc.date.issued 1990-05 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10106/2468 en
dc.description.abstract The von Neumann-Morgenstern solution (vN-M solution) or stable set is arguably the most dynamic and flexible solution concept for cooperative games with side-payments. Perhaps the most striking phenomenon is that vN-M solutions often suggest intricate coalition formation processes and corresponding payoffs. Why this occurs is not well understood. On the other hand, vN-M solutions are difficult to find. This paper deals with the class of discriminatory vN-M solutions and presents results that give insights in the corresponding coalition formation process. A computationally effective procedure is presented to answer the decision problem whether or not a proposed set of imputations to a given game is a discriminatory vN-M solution. en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher University of Texas at Arlington en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Technical Report;270 en
dc.subject Stable set en
dc.subject Cooperative games en
dc.subject Discriminatory vN-M solutions en
dc.subject Discriminatory set en
dc.subject Side-payments en
dc.subject Competing discriminatory set en
dc.subject Bargaining players en
dc.subject.lcsh Game theory en
dc.subject.lcsh Mathematics Research en
dc.title Discriminatory Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions en
dc.type Technical Report en
dc.publisher.department Department of Mathematics en

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