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Bargaining Sets with Thresholds

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Bargaining Sets with Thresholds

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dc.contributor.author Dragan, Irinel C. en
dc.date.accessioned 2010-06-09T15:26:22Z en
dc.date.available 2010-06-09T15:26:22Z en
dc.date.issued 1984-02 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10106/2437 en
dc.description.abstract A concept of bargaining set for cooperative n person games with side payments has been defined by assuming that a player could be attracted in a new coalition only if his supplementary gain exceeds a fixed threshold and could reject a new coalition only if his loss exceeds another fixed threshold. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the objections with thresholds and for the existence of the counter objections with thresholds associated to couples consisting of a group of players and a coalition structure subjected to some conditions have been proved. These results enabled us to state a combinatorial algorithm for establishing whether a given payoff configuration belongs to the bargaining set with thresholds, or not. en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher University of Texas at Arlington en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Technical Report;212 en
dc.subject n-person game en
dc.subject Cooperative games en
dc.subject Bargaining set en
dc.subject Algorithm en
dc.subject.lcsh Game theory en
dc.subject.lcsh Mathematics Research en
dc.title Bargaining Sets with Thresholds en
dc.type Technical Report en
dc.publisher.department Department of Mathematics en

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