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On a Class of Bargaining Schemes for Points in the Core of a Cooperative N-Person Game

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On a Class of Bargaining Schemes for Points in the Core of a Cooperative N-Person Game

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dc.contributor.author Censor, Yair en
dc.contributor.author Butnariu, Dan en
dc.date.accessioned 2010-06-08T17:25:25Z en
dc.date.available 2010-06-08T17:25:25Z en
dc.date.issued 1991-05 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10106/2388 en
dc.description.abstract Projection methods of solving convex feasibility problems lead naturally to a class of bargaining scheme's for points in the core of cooperative n-person games. Each such bargaining scheme is by itself a mathematical model of "rational behavior" describing a specific way of achieving "equilibrated" payoff vectors. We show that many of these bargaining schemes are "stable"' and have meaningful heuristic interpretations. en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher University of Texas at Arlington en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Technical Report;280 en
dc.subject n-person game en
dc.subject Bargaining scheme en
dc.subject cooperative n-person games en
dc.subject Mathematical models en
dc.subject.lcsh Game theory en
dc.subject.lcsh Mathematics Research en
dc.title On a Class of Bargaining Schemes for Points in the Core of a Cooperative N-Person Game en
dc.type Technical Report en
dc.publisher.department Department of Mathematics en

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