On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games

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On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games

Show simple item record Martínez-Legaz, Juan-Enrique en Dragan, Irinel C. en 2010-06-03T17:58:21Z en 2010-06-03T17:58:21Z en 1999-09 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract The Semivalues were introduced axiomatically by P.Dubey, A.Neyman and R.J.Weber (1981) as an important class of values for cooperative TU games. This class contains the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value, and many other values. For the Shapley value characterizations of games for which the Shapley value is coalitionally rational are due to Inarra and Usategui (1993), Izawa and Takahashi (1998), and Marin-Solano and Rafels (1999). In this paper the same problem of coalitional rationality is discussed for Semivalues, by using special formulas for the computation of Semivalues. The characterization shows that this is a prosperity property as defined by Van Gellekom, Potters and Reijnierse (1999) and a threshold for the property can be computed by using averages per capita. A characterization in terms of the Potential game is also given, by using concepts of average convexity and weak average convexity. en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher University of Texas at Arlington en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Technical Report;338 en
dc.subject Power game en
dc.subject Average convexity en
dc.subject Core en
dc.subject Potential game en
dc.subject Semivalue en
dc.subject TU games en
dc.subject Cooperative game en
dc.subject.lcsh Game theory en
dc.subject.lcsh Mathematics Research en
dc.title On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games en
dc.type Technical Report en
dc.publisher.department Department of Mathematics en

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