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The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Cooperative N-Person Game with Side Payments

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The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Cooperative N-Person Game with Side Payments

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Title: The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Cooperative N-Person Game with Side Payments
Author: Dragan, Irinel C.
Abstract: The bargaining sets have been introduced as solution concepts for cooperative n-person games with side payments by R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler (1964). A further study on the relationships between various concepts of solution for such games is due to R. J. Aumann and J. Dreze (1975). The Aumann/Maschler definition of a bargaining set relies upon a stability principle imposed to the payoffs in this set: an admissible payoff belongs to a bargaining set if for every objection against this payoff there is a counter objection. Two modification of the stability principle have been discussed in earlier papers of the author (Dragan,1985,1987,1988).
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10106/2477
Date: 1988-12

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