RESEARCH COMMONS
LIBRARY

On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games

ResearchCommons/Manakin Repository

On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games

Show full item record

Title: On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games
Author: Martínez-Legaz, Juan-Enrique; Dragan, Irinel C.
Abstract: The Semivalues were introduced axiomatically by P.Dubey, A.Neyman and R.J.Weber (1981) as an important class of values for cooperative TU games. This class contains the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value, and many other values. For the Shapley value characterizations of games for which the Shapley value is coalitionally rational are due to Inarra and Usategui (1993), Izawa and Takahashi (1998), and Marin-Solano and Rafels (1999). In this paper the same problem of coalitional rationality is discussed for Semivalues, by using special formulas for the computation of Semivalues. The characterization shows that this is a prosperity property as defined by Van Gellekom, Potters and Reijnierse (1999) and a threshold for the property can be computed by using averages per capita. A characterization in terms of the Potential game is also given, by using concepts of average convexity and weak average convexity.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10106/2320
Date: 1999-09

Files in this item

Files Size Format View Description
MathTechReport338.pdf 974.3Kb PDF View/Open PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show full item record

Browse

My Account

Statistics

About Us